Tag: environmental policy

Upholding Clean Energy in Colorado—and Hopefully Beyond

McNishBy Samantha Caravello—November 17 at 7:26 a.m.

Acting as laboratories for energy policy, some states have been much more effective than the federal government in promoting renewable energy development, often through the enactment of Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”). RPSs require electricity-selling companies to generate a minimum percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. These minimum targets generally increase over time, growing clean energy development and decreasing reliance on fossil fuels. RPSs are currently in place in 29 states and the District of Columbia, but a number of these state policies have been targeted by legal challenges.

Earlier this year, the pro-free market group Energy and Environment Legal Institute (“EELI”) filed a lawsuit challenging Colorado’s Renewable Energy Standard (“RES”), which was approved by Colorado voters in a 2004 ballot initiative and subsequently codified into state law. The RES creates a “Renewables Quota” for electricity retail utilities, requiring them to “generate, or cause to be generated, electricity from eligible energy resources” in specified amounts.[1]

In the lawsuit, Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel (“EELI”),[2] EELI claimed that the Renewables Quota violates the dormant Commerce Clause, which is a doctrine that courts have implied from Constitution’s Commerce Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from unlawfully burdening or discriminating against interstate commerce. In the Tenth Circuit, there are three ways a statute may violate this doctrine: first, if it clearly discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce; second, if it has the practical effect of regulating wholly outside the state; and third, if it imposes a burden on out-of-state commerce which is excessive in relation to the local benefits it creates.[3] Plaintiffs’ complaint focused on the second potential violation, alleging that the Renewables Quota improperly regulates wholly extraterritorial commerce.[4]

In May, the federal district court for the District of Colorado ruled in favor of state defendants and intervening environmental and renewable energy organizations and upheld the validity of the Colorado law. The court rejected plaintiffs’ extraterritoriality claims, concluding that the RES regulates only Colorado entities and those extraterritorial entities that choose to do business with Colorado entities.[5] The RES does not require out-of-state entities to do business in any particular manner, but simply determines whether energy purchased from an out-of-state generator will count towards a Colorado utility’s Renewables Quota.[6] Concluding that this did not amount to extraterritorial regulation, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Colorado and intervening environmental and renewable energy organizations.[7]

This decision was a success for clean energy—Colorado’s renewable energy sector is growing, jobs are being created, and public opinion supports the RPS. Unsurprisingly, though, plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In briefs filed over the past few months, plaintiffs argued that the district court improperly relied on a “factually inapposite, nonbinding case” from the Ninth Circuit instead of a Minnesota federal district court case that would have been more favorable to the plaintiff-appellants. The state and nonprofit respondents in the EELI case argue—convincingly, in my opinion—that plaintiffs have this wrong. (Not to mention that neither the Minnesota nor the Ninth Circuit case is binding on the District of Colorado or the Tenth Circuit.)

In the Ninth Circuit case, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,[8] that court upheld California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). Although the LCFS encouraged out-of-state entities to offer low carbon ethanol that would allow them access to the California market, the court determined that because there was no requirement for an out-of-state entity to meet particular standards, there was no extraterritorial regulation. In the District of Minnesota case, North Dakota v. Heydinger,[9] that court considered a Minnesota statute prohibiting the importation of electric power that would increase statewide carbon dioxide emissions, and it concluded that the statute did impermissibly regulate wholly out-of-state commerce. As the court held in EELI, the Colorado RES regulates only the Colorado market and affects out-of-state entities only insofar as they choose to respond to RES-created incentives. This feature makes the Colorado RES more similar to the California LCFS than to the Minnesota prohibition.

Both EELI and Heydinger are currently on appeal, and the outcome of these cases may impact similar challenges in other states and determine the likelihood of Supreme Court review on this issue. In June, the Supreme Court declined to hear Rocky Mountain Farmers Union,[10] leaving California’s LCFS in place, and perhaps indicating an unwillingness to decide whether state renewable energy incentives violate the dormant commerce clause. Or perhaps the Court, flooded with petitions warning of economic disaster due to environmental regulations, is just waiting until more circuit courts have spoken—and split—on the issue. Depending on how EELI and Heydinger turn out, these cases could provide sufficient reason for the Supreme Court to get involved. Given the states’ innovative leadership in this arena and Congress’s inability to take comprehensive action on climate and energy policy, the fate of Colorado’s RES may have significant implications for clean energy in this country.

UPDATE: The Tenth Circuit has scheduled oral argument for EELI v. Epel for January 21, 2015.

Harvard Law School’s Environmental Policy Initiative is tracking these cases and more at the State Power Project. The author relied on the State Power Project website to find some of the case briefs cited in this blog.


[1] Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-124 (West 2013).
[2] No. 11–cv–00859–WJM–BNB, 2014 WL 1874977 (D. Colo. May 9, 2014).
[3] Id. at *3.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at *6.
[6] Id.
[7] See id. at *7. The court also granted summary judgment for defendants on their claims that the RES does not discriminate against interstate commerce, id. at *5, and does not improperly burden interstate commerce relative to local benefits, id. at 9. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show any burden imposed by the RES on interstate commerce. Id.
[8] Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
[9] No. 11–cv–3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014).
[10] Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).

Promises and Pitfalls in China’s New Environmental Protection Law

file0001225592472(1)By Daniel Carpenter-Gold—September 14 at 6:30 p.m.

To read more on this topic, look for Mr. Carpenter-Gold’s student note in the upcoming Volume 39.1 of the Harvard Environmental Law Review.

Chinese environmental policy has been rapidly modernizing over the past few years, likely in response to highly visible pollution. Among these changes, the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) has been almost completely rewritten to greatly strengthen the country’s environmental law regime. One-off fines (criticized as being far less than the actual cost of compliance with the law) are out; daily penalties (Art. 59), confiscation of equipment (Art. 25), and even jail time for “the person directly in charge” of the polluting entity (Art. 63) are in. The groundwork has been laid for a comprehensive emissions permitting system (Art. 45). Regions which fail to meet environmental targets designated by the central government will face blanket suspensions of the right to undertake new construction projects (Art. 44). Finally, a number of new avenues for public participation have been opened up (Arts. 53–58). Significant among these is the right, for some organizations, to bring litigation in the public interest against polluters (Art. 58).

Many of these provisions will be familiar to students and practitioners of US environmental law. This is no accident—substantial effort, by NGOs and the US government alike, has gone into encouraging the Chinese government to adopt more Western environmental standards. These projects have run the gamut from regular visits by EPA’s general counsel, to experts’ reports, to study tours for academics and practitioners, and they have paid off in the new EPL, whose language equals or even exceeds that of US environmental legislation.

In addition to borrowing from international experience, China has used its own local governments to experiment with expanded standing provisions. Environmental public-interest litigation in China has, over the past decade, been slowly introduced in some counties and municipalities. Although cases under these regulations have been almost exclusively brought by government-organized NGOs, they seemed to have demonstrated the viability of a Chinese environmental public-interest litigation system.

The central government, apparently encouraged both by the international community and by the success of such provisions at the local level, amended the Civil Procedure Law (CPL) in 2012 to grant standing to “relevant organizations” that bring lawsuits to address environmental harms. This should have enabled a new wave of litigation from environmental NGOs. Indeed, high-powered organizations such as the All-China Environment Federation attempted to file a number of cases after the change. However, outside of the regions which already had provided for environmental public-interest litigation, the courts have universally refused to allow cases brought under the amended law, offering only thin excuses or none at all.

Why couldn’t this policy, which has been in use for years in some parts of China and for decades abroad (with no greater specificity), succeed at the national level? The answer lies in the particular structure of China’s judiciary: the local governments in China control the budget and personnel decisions of local courts. Where the local government does not wish to have the expanded regulatory oversight that public-interest litigation brings, it can easily pressure the courts into refusing the cases. Neither US nor local jurisdictions which had implemented expanded standing provisions had to cope with the divide between central and local governments: in the US this was not an issue because of American judicial independence, and the Chinese localities which allowed environmental public-interest litigation were presumably already supportive of environmental protection.

Regulatory decisions are always of uncertain impact, and a country can be forgiven for taking paths already trod rather than experimenting on their own people. But borrowing policies from other countries, or even from their own subunits, can only work to the extent that the borrower carefully evaluates the differences between the two systems. In amending the CPL, China seems to have overlooked the problem of local-government resistance, presumably because the cases which were used in developing the law did not have this problem.

The experience of the 2012 CPL suggests that the public interest litigation provisions of the Environmental Protection Law may be weaker in practice than they appear on paper. The new law asks a lot of local governments, and particularly local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), the local-level agencies in charge of enforcing most environmental regulations, which are beholden to the governments at their level to the same extent that the local courts are. However, the EPL takes some steps toward strengthening central control over EPBs by allowing EPBs at a higher governmental level to discipline EPBs within their jurisdiction (Art. 67, for example). There is also talk of increasing central control of the court system, which could remove some of the local governments’ influence. There is likely to remain a substantial gap between the law on paper and the law as enforced, but the overall trend is toward strengthening governance and the rule of law. That’s good news for China’s environment.

It’s Raining Cert Petitions!: Last Term’s Biggest Supreme Court News

Supreme CourtBy Richard Lazarus — Sep. 11, 2014 at 9:05 a.m.

This article originally appeared in the September/October 2014 issue of The Environmental Forum. The Environmental Law Institute has graciously allowed the Harvard Environmental Law Review Blog to republish the piece.

The biggest environmental law news from the Supreme Court last term may well not have been the Court’s rulings in two high profile Clean Air Act cases. To be sure, both EPA v. EME Homer City Generation and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA were true blockbusters. EME Homer, which upheld EPA’s ambitious rulemaking to combat interstate air pollution, was plainly a huge victory for the Environmental Protection Agency.

But, potentially more important, yet largely unnoticed and unreported, were the Court’s repeated denials last spring of a series of petitions filed by business interests seeking the Court’s review of a series of adverse appellate rulings. At one point the deluge of such petitions led one lawyer, who frequently represents environmental groups, to remark gamely, “It’s raining cert petitions!”

The reason for the onslaught is clear. The business community has in recent years enjoyed considerable success in persuading the justices to grant review in environmental cases that otherwise seemed to lack the obvious trappings of a cert-worthy case, lacking clear conflicts in the federal courts of appeals. Cases in which the potential for further agency action made unclear the actual, practical significance of the appellate court’s ruling. And even cases in which the solicitor general, after being invited by the High Court to express its views concerning whether review was warranted, recommended against.

In short, the Court often appeared to be operating on a hair trigger in considering business claims that the lower courts had endorsed overreaching of federal environmental laws. But this spring, the Court repeatedly said no, leaving industry lawyers a bit baffled by the Court’s sudden betrayal.

Four times business interests embraced what had heretofore been a winning strategy. They hired the best Supreme Court lawyers — the ones who know the Court best, and even more important, the ones the justices and their law clerks know the best and therefore might be more likely to give weight to their views. Former Solicitor General Paul Clement. Sidley & Austin’s Peter Keisler. And Stanford law professor and formal appellate judge Mike McConnell. The business petitioners recruited legions of amicus curiae to file briefs in support of the Court’s granting review. These briefs would invariably describe the “crippling,” “severe,” “intolerable,” “deleterious,” “crushing,” and “staggering” consequences to the nation’s economy if the Court left standing these adverse lower court rulings.

No one was better, however, than the Chamber of Commerce in describing the economic havoc and destruction that would occur absent the Court’s review. In each of the successive cases, the chamber’s predictions grew more dire.

Although candidly acknowledging that it would “difficult to overstate the importance” of the lower court’s ruling for business, the chamber did not shy away from doing its best to do just that. It described in one case how the “crippling uncertainty and costs” would “exacerbat[e]” existing energy shortages” because “power plants faced with a new onslaught of tort liability may choose to cease operations.” In another, the lower court’s ruling “will undermine the proper functioning of the nation’s integrated national market in transportation fuels.”

Not to be outdone by its competing predictions of economic cataclysm, the chamber contended in yet another case that a Second Circuit decision “would transform every public drinking water supply in this country — indeed every future supply — into a ready-made multi-million-dollar lawsuit.” It “would open the floodgates to claims against virtually every manner of human enterprise” and the “consequences could extend to all corners of our economy.”

Finally, the chamber described the “staggering” economic consequences of the D.C. Circuit’s upholding of EPA’s authority to override a Clean Water Act permit previously issued by the Army Corps of Engineers. That ruling placed at risk “over $220 billion of investment annually,” that in turn the chamber calculated generated $660 billion of downstream economic activity, or almost four percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product.

The Court nonetheless denied review all four times: first in Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA in March; then Exxon v. City of New York in April, and twice in June, Gen-On Power Midwest v. Bell, at the beginning of the month, and finally in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, just before adjourning for the summer. No justice dissented.

There is, of course, a useful lesson here. Zealous advocacy is to be expected. But exaggerated advocacy is counterproductive, especially in the High Court when, by spring time, the justices’ law clerks are more seasoned and can more readily tell the difference between the two.

And, most happily, the chamber’s prophecies have not (yet) borne out. Whew!

 

Richard Lazarus is the Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law at Harvard University.

The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China

By Alex L. Wang

During China’s 11th five-year plan (2006–10), bureaucrats began to take substantial actions on environmental protection, making major investments in pollution control infrastructure and forcing the shutdown of thousands of outdated facilities and production lines. This was not accomplished through meaningful reform of a notoriously weak environmental law regime. Rather, Chinese authorities turned to cadre evaluation — the system for top-down bureaucratic personnel assessments — to set high-priority, quantitative environmental targets designed to mobilize governors, mayors, and state-owned enterprise leaders in every corner of China’s massive bureaucracy.

While conventional analysis has primarily viewed this effort through the lens of environmental protection, this Article argues that “environmental cadre evaluation” is better understood as something more fundamental. Chinese authorities have embraced environmental cadre evaluation as a tool for limiting risks to the party-state’s hold on power, using environmental protection in an unexpected way to deliver economic growth and social stability. Environmental objectives have been elevated, but primarily to the extent they support these other values as well.

But implementation problems inherent to this top-down approach abound. Local agents falsify information and shut down pollution control equipment. Closed factories are secretly reopened. These problems create an imperative for reform. Of the initiatives already under way, governance reforms that strengthen public supervision have particular advantages for resolving institutional pathologies that limit the effectiveness of China’s environmental efforts.

By examining why and how Chinese leaders have elevated environmental priorities through the cadre evaluation system, this Article seeks to offer insight into a number of broader ongoing debates — about environmental regulation in developing countries, accountability and regime survival in authoritarian states, and legal development in China.

Cite as: Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365 (2013).

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Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Should)

By Ryan P. Kelly and Margaret R. Caldwell

The ocean is becoming more acidic worldwide as a result of increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and other pollutants. This fundamental change is likely to have substantial ecological and economic consequences globally. In this Article, we provide a toolbox for understanding and addressing the drivers of ocean acidification. We begin with an overview of the relevant science, highlighting known causes of chemical change in the coastal ocean. Because of the difficulties associated with controlling diffuse atmospheric pollutants such as CO2, we then focus on controlling smaller-scale agents of acidification, discussing ten legal and policy tools that state government agencies can use to mitigate the problem. This bottom-up approach does not solve the global CO2 problem, but instead offers a more immediate means of addressing the challenges of a rapidly changing ocean. States have ample legal authority to address many of the causes of ocean acidification; what remains is to implement that authority to safeguard our iconic coastal resources.

Cite as: Ryan P. Kelly and Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Should), 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 57 (2013).

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American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law

By Jedediah Purdy

There is a firestorm of political and cultural conflict around environmental issues, including, but running well beyond, climate change. Legal scholarship is in a bad position to make sense of this conflict because the field has concentrated on making sound policy recommendations to an idealized lawmaker, neglecting the deeply held and sharply clashing values that drive, or block, environmental lawmaking. This Article sets out a framework for understanding and engaging the clash of values in environmental law and, by extension, approaching the field more generally. Americans have held, and legislated based upon, four distinct ideas about why the natural world matters and how we should govern it. Each of these conceptions persists in a body of environmental law, a network of interest and advocacy groups, the attitudes and even identities of ordinary citizens, and even the American landscape. The first, providential republicanism, treats nature as intended for productive human use and gives high status to its users: this idea justified the European claim to North America, defined public debates about nature in the early republic, and persists in important aspects of private and public land-use law. The second conception, progressive management, arose in the later nineteenth century as part of a broader legal reform movement and gave its shape to much of federal lands policy, notably creation of the national forests and national parks. In this idea, nature’s productive use requires extensive management by public-spirited experts, whom reformers imagined as steering the environmental policy of the administrative state. The third conception, romantic epiphany, concentrates on the aesthetic and spiritual value of nature and has defined national parks policy, spurred creation of the national wilderness system, and lent essential support to the Endangered Species Act. This idea entered environmental politics at the turn of the last century, with the efforts of the Sierra Club and other innovators. The most recent conception of nature, ecological interdependence, arose in the middle of the twentieth century and shaped much of the environmental law of the 1970s and thereafter. This conception treats nature as an intensely inter-permeable web, of which humans are unavoidably a part, to our benefit and hazard. All of these ideas persist in today’s environmental law and politics and provide a map of our existing statutes and doctrines, the conflicts around those laws, and emerging issues such as climate change.

Cite as: Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 169 (2012).

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Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner

By David M. Driesen

This Article compares the relative merits of feasibility and cost-benefit based regulation, responding to a recent article by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner on this topic. Normatively, it shows that the lack of correlation between non-subsistence consumption and welfare supports the argument that regulation should be strict, unless widespread plant shutdowns, which would seriously impact well-being, are involved. It demonstrates that a host of practical defects Masur and Posner find in feasibility analysis would infect cost-benefit analysis as well in light of the importance of cost’s distribution, the feasibility principle respresents a reasonable effort to politically resolve difficult normative issues.

Cite as: David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313 (2011).

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