By David M. Driesen
This Article compares the relative merits of feasibility and cost-benefit based regulation, responding to a recent article by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner on this topic. Normatively, it shows that the lack of correlation between non-subsistence consumption and welfare supports the argument that regulation should be strict, unless widespread plant shutdowns, which would seriously impact well-being, are involved. It demonstrates that a host of practical defects Masur and Posner find in feasibility analysis would infect cost-benefit analysis as well in light of the importance of cost’s distribution, the feasibility principle respresents a reasonable effort to politically resolve difficult normative issues.
Cite as: David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313 (2011).[btn link=”http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/vol35_2/Driesen.pdf” color=”forestGreen” size=”size-l”]View Full Article (PDF)[/btn]